Snippets about: Crime
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How New York's Crime Epidemic Tipped
In the mid-1990s, crime in New York City plummeted rapidly and dramatically - the murder rate fell by 2/3 in 5 years. Gladwell argues this epidemic of crime reduction tipped due to a combination of small, subtle factors:
- Fixing broken windows and cleaning up graffiti - sending a signal of order
- Cracking down on fare-beating in the subways
- Rebuilding the organizational structure and management of the police
These changes in environment and context made people more likely to obey the law. The decline was too rapid to be explained by big slow variables like the economy, drug use, etc. "The Power of Context says that human beings are a lot more sensitive to their environment than they may seem."
Section: 1, Chapter: 1
Book: The Tipping Point
Author: Malcolm Gladwell
Why Many Common Theories For The Crime Drop Are Wrong
The authors debunk several popular theories for why crime fell so sharply in the 1990s:
- Tougher gun laws - Crime fell just as sharply in states without any changes to their gun laws, and the much-touted Brady Act only had a very modest impact
- Increased use of capital punishment - The death penalty is applied too infrequently to have a large impact, and crime fell even in states without capital punishment
- More innovative policing strategies - New York City's "broken windows" policing gets more credit than it likely deserves, as crime fell nationally even in cities that didn't adopt new policing tactics
- The strong economy - The link between economic conditions and violent crime is relatively weak and inconsistent, and the timing doesn't match up (crime was falling before the 1990s boom)
- Younger demographics - Demographic trends actually pointed towards a crime increase in the 1990s as the teenage share of the population rose
By process of elimination, the authors come back to legalized abortion, increased incarceration, more police, and the fading of the crack epidemic as the only factors that can really explain the magnitude and timing of the huge 1990s crime drop.
Section: 1, Chapter: 4
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
Drug Dealers Are Like Aspiring Authors And Actors
Most street-level drug dealers are not in it for the money - at least not the meager money they make today. Instead, like many aspiring authors, actors, and athletes, they are in it for the chance, however small, of making it big in the future.
The drug trade is like a "tournament" where dealers accept high risk and low wages in exchange for a slim shot at ascending the hierarchy and earning an outsized payoff. This helps explain why the drug trade can attract so many foot soldiers despite terrible base compensation. The average dealer may earn less than $4 per hour, but dreams of becoming the next Stringer Bell.
Of course, the vast majority will not ascend to the top, just like most authors won't become J.K. Rowling and most high school athletes won't go pro. But the small possibility is enough to motivate many to try.
Section: 1, Chapter: 3
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
Why Drug Dealers Are Like McDonald's Franchisees
The authors compare the organizational structure and economics of the crack gang to that of McDonald's:
- Like McDonald's, the gang has a franchise-like model where regional managers ("board of directors") take a cut of profits from the local gang chapters they oversee
- The gang has a clear hierarchy and pay scale, with wages increasing at each level (though still meager for most)
- Workers at the bottom (drug dealers or burger flippers) earn the least but are the most visible to the public
- The promise of rising up the hierarchy motivates low-paid workers to stay loyal despite poor base pay
So while street-level crack dealing seems like a drastically different profession than fast food, the underlying business models and worker incentives are surprisingly similar. The allure of future riches entices the many to toil for low wages.
Section: 1, Chapter: 3
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
The Law Of The Few Drives The L.A. Bank Robbery Epidemic
In the 1980s and 90s, Los Angeles suffered an epidemic of bank robberies, driven by a small number of "super-robbers" like the Yankee Bandit, Casper and C-Dog. These criminals robbed prolifically and influenced copycats, demonstrating the "Law of the Few" - that social epidemics are driven by the extraordinary actions of a small number of people. The context also enabled the epidemic, with the number of bank branches in the U.S. tripling from the 1970s to 1990s.
Section: 1, Chapter: 1
Book: Revenge of the Tipping Point
Author: Malcolm Gladwell
The Miami Overstory Shapes Philip Esformes
Healthcare mogul Philip Esformes ran a massive Medicare fraud scheme out of his Florida nursing homes. At his sentencing, Rabbi Sholom Lipskar argued Esformes was corrupted by moving from Chicago to Miami, saying he "lost himself" and "went down a wrong path" after arriving in Florida. Suggesting that the "overstory" - the attitudes and narratives - of Miami's culture shaped Esformes' descent into crime.
Section: 1, Chapter: 2
Book: Revenge of the Tipping Point
Author: Malcolm Gladwell
"Abortion Leads To Less Crime"
"Our theory does not suggest that the legalization of abortion can account for all of the decline in crime. Clearly, many other factors may also be at play: a strong economy, increases in the number of police, and the rising prison population, among them. But legalized abortion should not be overlooked. It was perhaps the single most important event of the last half century in leading to the abrupt and unexpected decline in crime that the United States has experienced."
Section: 1, Chapter: 4
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
The Five Factors That Explain The 1990s Crime Drop
According to the authors, there were five key factors that drove the dramatic decline in U.S. crime in the 1990s:
- Increased incarceration - More criminals in prison meant fewer on the streets
- More police - A rising number of police per capita increased the risk of getting caught
- The end of the crack epidemic - Crack markets matured and violence subsided as dealers focused more on customer retention vs. turf wars
- Legalized abortion - Fewer unwanted pregnancies 20 years prior meant fewer children grew up in environments that incline one towards crime
- The strong 1990s economy - Economic growth and low unemployment made crime a relatively less attractive option
However, the authors argue the first four factors account for the lion's share of the crime drop, with abortion alone responsible for as much as 30% of the decline. Improved policing tactics and the innovative CompStat system rolled out in New York City, on the other hand, likely had little impact despite receiving significant media attention.
Section: 1, Chapter: 4
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
The Invention Of Crack Cocaine As A "Disruptive Innovation"
The authors draw an analogy between the invention of crack cocaine in the 1980s and the invention of nylon stockings in the 1930s. Both innovations made a previously expensive luxury item (powder cocaine or silk stockings) much cheaper and more widely available.
Crack was like the "fast fashion" of the drug world - it democratized what had been an elite indulgence. Suddenly cocaine went from a premium product favored by the rich to an affordable mass market good. This unleashed a devastating wave of addiction, violence, and community destruction, especially in inner city neighborhoods.
The flood of cheap crack served as a disruptive innovation much like digital photography, MP3s, or e-books. It upended the market and brought both benefits (a less expensive alternative for consumers) and steep costs (decimated rivals and traditional institutions). The invention of crack created entirely new markets and reshaped the culture in profound ways.
Section: 1, Chapter: 3
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
The Myth Of The Wealthy Drug Dealer
Chapter 3 explores the economics of the illegal drug trade through the lens of a Chicago crack cocaine gang. Contrary to the common portrayal in popular media of the affluent drug kingpin, the data shows that the vast majority of street-level drug dealers earn very little and still live with their mothers. The typical crack dealer in the gang worked long, dangerous hours for only about $3.30 an hour - less than minimum wage.
Only the very top of the drug gang pyramid, perhaps 2-3% of the members, earned substantial incomes. This is similar to the extreme income inequality in corporate America, where the CEO and top executives earn vastly more than rank-and-file workers.
Section: 1, Chapter: 3
Book: Freakonomics
Author: Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner